Tradable credit scheme for rush hour travel choice with heterogeneous commuters by Xiao, LL et al.
Special Issue Article
Advances in Mechanical Engineering
2015, Vol. 7(10) 1–12
 The Author(s) 2015
DOI: 10.1177/1687814015612430
aime.sagepub.com
Tradable credit scheme for rush hour
travel choice with heterogeneous
commuters
Ling-Ling Xiao1, Hai-Jun Huang2 and Ronghui Liu3
Abstract
This article proposes a tradable credit scheme for managing commuters’ travel choices. The scheme considers bottle-
neck congestion and modal split in a competitive highway–transit network with heterogeneous commuters who are dis-
tinguished by their valuation of travel time. The scheme charges all auto travelers who pass the bottleneck during a
peak-time window in the form of mobility credits. Those who avoid the peak-time window, by either traveling outside
the peak-time window or switching to the transit mode, may be rewarded credits. An artificial market is created so that
the travelers may trade these credits with each other. We formulate the credit price and the rewarded and charged
credits under tradable credit scheme. Our analyses indicate that the optimal tradable credit scheme can achieve nearly
40% efficiency gains depending on the level of commuters’ heterogeneity. In addition, this scheme distributes the benefits
among all the commuters directly through the credit trading. Our results suggest that in assessing the efficiency of trad-
able credit scheme, it is important to take into account the commuters’ heterogeneity. Numerical experiments are con-
ducted to examine the sensitivity of tradable credit scheme designs to various system parameters.
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Introduction
Congestion in morning commuter traffic has tradition-
ally been modeled as a bottleneck problem. The classic
bottleneck model was developed by Vickrey1 who stud-
ied the commuting congestion in a highway between a
residential area and a workplace. It shows that there
exists an equilibrium departure-time pattern, whereby
all commuters incur the same travel cost no matter
when they start their trips. Traffic congestion taking
the form of queuing behind a bottleneck is a dead-
weight loss to system efficiency. The bottleneck model
offers a flexible framework for investigating the effects
of congestion pricing schemes to alleviate the queue
behind the bottleneck.2–4 In this context, congestion
pricing is found to be efficient in internalizing the
external costs of the traffic by inducing the change in
departure pattern.
Since the idea was first put forward by Pigou5 and
Knight,6 congestion pricing has become a widely
known mechanism to regulate traffic congestion.
However, it is also known to induce inequity among
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commuters if the differences in their values of time are
not properly taken into account. This issue has been
addressed in the literature. The effect of congestion
pricing on different commuter groups is demonstrated
theoretically with a static network analysis method7–9
and with the bottleneck modeling method.10–14 There
have been recent interests in the design of more equita-
ble and practical congestion management schemes. An
example of such alternative is the ‘‘tradable permit sys-
tem’’ by which the eligible residents will receive a cer-
tain amount of ‘‘rights’’ for the scarce good. Verhoef
et al.15 discussed the possibilities of using tradable per-
mits in the regulation of road transport externalities.
Akamatsu et al.16 proposed a ‘‘tradable bottleneck per-
mits’’ (TBPs) scheme for resolving the morning com-
mute problem. In their model, the road manager issues
the ‘‘bottleneck permits’’ to road users, and the permits
are tradable in auction markets.
Recently, the cap-and-trade scheme, which involves
issuing mobility credits and allowing travelers to trade
in a market, seeks to couple quantity restriction with a
trading mechanism. It is also known as tradable credit
scheme (TCS)17 and has been extensively studied.18–20
Xiao et al.21 analyzed the TCSs in the context of the
morning commute problem. Their model replaces
Vickrey’s toll with a corresponding time-varying credit
charge and an initial allocation of credits. Their results
indicate that the credit market can achieve the system
optimum even when travelers differ in their values of
time. Nie22 adopts tradable credit to replace single
step-coarse toll with homogeneous commuters in bot-
tleneck model with respect to three different behavior
assumptions.2,23–26
Recently, Tian et al.27 proposed the time-dependent
credit charge scheme to manage bottleneck congestion
and modal split with heterogeneous users. However,
such a complex credit structure is not very well accepted
by travelers as they cannot predict the amount of charg-
ing they would have to pay in advance. This impels us
to develop more practical TCS, which delineates an off-
peak credit-rewarding and a peak-time credit-charging
systems. In addition, we consider mode choice (between
auto and transit modes) in the morning commuting
problem as well as heterogeneity in commuters’ Value-
Of-Time (VOT). We assume that the travelers’ VOT is
continuously distributed across the population and pro-
pose a new tradable credit based on different travelers’
behavior assumptions. Compared with the traditional
step-coarse tolls, this scheme is revenue neutral and
hence less likely to be perceived as another taxation
instrument.
Introducing the TCS proposed by Yang and Wang17
into a mode-choice problem has the potential to lead to
revenue-neutral transport pricing and subsidy policy.
Inspired by this consideration, this article aims at devel-
oping efficient TCS that makes everyone better off and
that reduces social cost in a competitive two-mode net-
work. Without loss of generality, we deal with the two-
mode morning commuting problem with road bottle-
neck congestion and incorporate user heterogeneity by
assuming that travelers’ VOT is continuously distribu-
ted across the population. Under the credit scheme, tra-
velers will divide themselves among two modes and
choose different departure time for going through the
bottleneck according to their own preferences and sell
and buy additional credits according to their individual
travel needs. The resulting equilibrium price of credits
in the trading market and the competitive two-mode
traffic equilibrium will thus be ascertained.
The next section presents a bottleneck model of
morning commute problem considering the heterogene-
ity of commuters and discusses the equilibrium without
tolling. Section ‘‘TCS for a single bottleneck with het-
erogeneity’’ proposes a TCS for morning commute
problem and looks into the changes in individual travel
cost before and after the optimal credit scheme. The
two-mode equilibrium with the TCSs is derived in sec-
tion ‘‘Departure time and mode choice in the presence
of optimal TCS.’’ In section ‘‘Numerical examples,’’ a
numerical example is presented to illustrate the effect
of commuter heterogeneity on equilibrium solutions
with credit scheme. Finally, section ‘‘Summary and
concluding remarks’’ draws the conclusions.
No-toll scheme for a single bottleneck
with heterogeneity
User heterogeneity can be resulted from income differ-
ences between otherwise identical commuters.
Following the literature, we represent user heterogene-
ity in terms of different unit costs of travel time (a),
schedule delay early (b), and schedule delay late (g)
across commuters. In most of the existing literature,
heterogeneous commuters are grouped into a set of dis-
crete user classes: within each class, commuters have
the same unit costs. For example, Arnott et al.11 define
a series of discrete groups of commuters in order of
increasing b=a ratios. They provided analytical solu-
tions for no-toll equilibrium for three groups of com-
muters and compared the welfare effects with optimal
time-varying toll for two groups of commuters. In this
article, user heterogeneity is incorporated by ranking
users according to a continuously increasing VOT func-
tion. We provide analytical solutions for no-toll equili-
brium and social optimal tolls for these heterogeneous
commuters with continuously distributed VOT.
We assume here that everyone has the same work
flexibility, and the ratio between the unit penalties for
the queuing delay and schedule delay is the same for all
commuters, that is, b(x)=a(x)=h1, g(x)=a(x)=h2,
and follows a distribution
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F vð Þ=Pr a xð Þ\vf g ð1Þ
where h1 and h2 are constants and satisfy
0\h1\1\h2. Here a(x), b(x), and g(x) are the values
of queuing delay, early arrival penalty, and late arrival
penalty for the xth user, respectively. For convenience,
we arrange the commuters in increasing order of a,
such that a(x) is monotone and increasing with x, for
example, a(x1).a(x2) for x1.x2.
Suppose there are two competing modes of a high-
way and transit line connecting a single pair of origin
and destination. It is assumed that a fixed number of N
commuters travel from the origin to the destination
each morning either with the highway or transit and
hope to arrive at the destination at the work starting
time t, which is normalized to be zero in our analysis.
For simplicity and without loss of generality, it is fur-
ther assumed that the free-flow time on highway is
zero. As assumed in the Tabuchi’s model, the external
demand elasticity is ignored, but internal elasticity is
considered by allowing inter-modal competition. Let
Nf and Ng denote the number of highway users and
transit users, respectively, and Nf +Ng =N .
The highway exhibits bottleneck congestion, which
is characterized by the standard bottleneck model
developed initially by Vickrey.1 In no-toll scheme, the
trip cost of the xth person traversing the bottleneck and
taking into account schedule delay early and schedule
delay late penalties becomes
C x, tð Þ= a xð ÞT tð Þ+b xð Þ t
  t  T tð Þð Þ, if te\t tt
a xð ÞT tð Þ+ g xð Þ t+ T tð Þ  tð Þ, if tt\t tl

ð2Þ
where T (t) denotes the commuting time, and t the
desired arrive time (which is assumed to be the same
work starting time for all commutes). te and tl denote
the earliest and the latest departure time and tt the tran-
sition between schedule early and late.
In order to derive the equilibrium based on no-toll
scheme, we define the function of generalized queuing
time as follows
C^N tð Þ= C x, tð Þ
a xð Þ
=
T tð Þ+h1 t  t  T tð Þð Þ, if te\t tt
T tð Þ+h2 t+ T tð Þ  tð Þ, if tt\t tl
 ð3Þ
where te and tl denote the earliest and the latest depar-
ture time and tt the transition between schedule early
and late. From the above equations, the schedule delay
is translated into an equivalent travel time for the xth
commuter, and the generalized travel time is indepen-
dent to a.
Under user equilibrium without toll, C^N should be
the same for everyone regardless of the VOT. Thus, at
equilibrium, there is no difference in generalized queu-
ing time with respect to departure time, that is,
dC^N (t)=dt= 0. Then we have
T 9 tð Þ=
h1
1 h1
, if te\t tt
h2
1+h2
, if tt\t tl
8><
>: ð4Þ
Since the first and last departures confront no queue
at bottleneck, the cumulative departure flow at the last
time tl equals to the traffic demand N , that is,
tl= te+N=s, where s is the capacity of the bottleneck.
Using C^N (te)= C^N (tl)= C^N (te+N=s)=h1(t
  te), we
have
te= t
  Nd
sh1
, tl = t
+
Nd
sh2
, and tt= t
  Nd
s
where d=h1h2=(h1+h2). Rearranging the above
results, we obtain the equilibrium trip cost of every
commuter as follows
C xð Þ=a xð ÞdN
s
ð5Þ
The system trip cost calculated in monetary unit is
obtained by integrating the individual costs throughout
the whole population
STCN =
ðN
0
a xð ÞdN
s
dx= d
N
s
ðN
0
a xð Þdx ð6Þ
For homogeneous travelers, the system total cost
becomes STCN =adN
2=s
TCS for a single bottleneck with
heterogeneity
Here, we focus on step-coarse toll under proportional
heterogeneity. And let us first explain how a step-coarse
toll works in a single bottleneck. A key question in ana-
lyzing a step-coarse toll is how to deal with discontinu-
ously taking place at the boundary of the peak-time
window. Such discontinuity forces users arriving at the
boundary to have different travel delays, depending on
whether or not they pay the toll. Arnott et al.2 argued
that because the first person who pays the toll must
have a lower travel delay compared to his or her imme-
diate predecessor who escape the toll, he or she must
arrive at the bottleneck later by r=a, which in turn
implies that there must be a period of time during which
the arrival rate at the bottleneck is zero (see Figure 1).
The discontinuity between the last person who pays the
toll and his or her immediate successor leads to the fol-
lowing behavioral assumptions:
Xiao et al. 3
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Mass departure (MD),2 which assumes that a MD at
the bottleneck occurs immediately after the toll is
lifted (see Figure 1(a), at time t), and that the com-
muters in the mass experiences an identical expected
general cost which offsets the toll.
Separated waiting (SW),23,24 in which commuters
who choose to pass the bottleneck after a tolling period
can wait on a set of secondary lanes (the dotted blue
curve in Figure 1(b)) without impeding other drivers
who do pass the bottleneck in that tolling period.
Braking-induced idling (BI),25 which assumes that
commuters would slow down or stop just before
reaching a tolling point and wait until the toll is low-
ered from one step to the next step before proceed-
ing. The equilibrium departure-time patterns as
derived by the above authors, under homogeneous
conditions, are reproduced in Figure 1(c). Some of
the key characteristics of these assumptions are fur-
ther described in this section.
Under heterogeneous preferences, the optimal
coarse tolling of congestion corresponding to the above
assumptions is analyzed (see Van den Berg,28 for
details). Based on the proportional heterogeneity, total
cost will be minimized with respect to the number of
un-tolled users (V ) and then there are N  V tolled
users. The level of the coarse toll (r) is such that at the
start (t+) and end (t) of the tolled period, the queue is
zero. For a given number of un-tolled commuters V ,
the rushing hour period and the tolling window are
given as follows
te= t
  d
h1
N
s
+v
V
s
; tl = t
+
d
h2
N
s
+m
V
s
ð7Þ
t+= te+
s
h1
V
s
; t= tl  s
l
V
s
; r=s
V
s
a Vð Þ ð8Þ
where s,v, andm are parameters dependent on the
behavior assumptions, as specified in Table 1.
Figure 1. Equilibrium with a coarse toll based on three different behavioral assumptions: (a) MD, (b) SW, and (c) BI.
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The number of commuters who pay the toll is
Nt = t
  t+ s=N + m v s
l
 s
h1
 
V ð9Þ
Also, the system travel cost excluding toll is
STC=
ðV
0
b xð Þ t  teð Þdx+
ðN
V
b xð Þ t  t+ dx
=A d
N
s
 vh1
V
s
 
 A2 sV
s
ð10Þ
and
A1=
ðV
0
a xð Þdx, A2=
ðN
V
a xð Þdx,
A=A1+A2=
ðN
0
a xð Þdx
ð11Þ
By taking ∂STC(V )=∂V = 0, we obtain the first-order
optimality condition in which only V is variable
a Vð ÞV 
ðN
V
a xð Þdx= vh1
s
ðN
0
a xð Þdx ð12Þ
Equation (12) implicitly determines the amount of
commuters V who are traveling outside the tolling
period after toll is imposed, as long as the VOT distri-
bution of the commuter population is known.
Generally, we cannot obtain the explicit expression of
V except for simple forms of VOT distribution. For
instance, if VOT follows a uniform distribution, that is,
a(x)= ax+ b, a.0, and b.0, we can obtain that
V =
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
4b2+ 6a vh1s + 1
 
a
2
N 2+ bN
 q  2b
3a
ð13Þ
Substituting the parameters of Table 1 into equation
(13), it is clear that VM.VS.VB, here subscripts M , S,B
denote the behavior assumptions.
In the TCS, authority delineates a peak-time win-
dow ½t+, t and requires all travelers who pass the bot-
tleneck within that window to pay k units of mobility
credits. The authority rewards r units of credits to those
who travel during the off-peak time, that is,
½te, t+ [ ½t, tl. A market is created such that those
who need to pay credits can purchase them from those
who acquired them. Assume that this market is cleared
in the sense that the total number of credits earned by
the off-peak users equal the number of credits used by
the peak-time users, which leads to
N  Vð Þk=Vr ð14Þ
or
r
k
=
N  V
V
ð15Þ
which represents the ratio between the unit of reward
for travel in the off-peak to the unit of pay in peak
travel. It is also easy to see that
(∂r=k)=∂V =  N=V 2\0, implying that the ratio of
reward to pay decreases with the increase in the num-
ber of uncharged commuters.
The trading between the off-peak and peak users can
be translated into a peak-time step-coarse toll
r=P r+ kð Þ ð16Þ
where P represents a market clearing price of the
credits.
Adopting the same uniform VOT distribution
a(x)= ax+ b, we examine the ratio between reward
and pay r=k with the optimal coarse toll of this section
and under the different behavioral assumptions.
For heterogeneous users with the special case a 6¼ 0
and b= 0, substituting equation (13) into equation (15),
we note that the SW assumption leads to r=k= 0:73
and r=k= 0:66 for the MD assumption and r=k= 0:87
for the BI assumption. For homogeneous users, that is,
a= 0 and b 6¼ 0, taking the optimal V from equation
(13), we obtain r=k= 1 for SW, r=k= 0:85 for MD,
and r=k= 1:34 for BI assumptions.
Departure time and mode choice in the
presence of optimal TCS
A TCS was first proposed by Yang and Wang,17 and
may be used to replace Vickrey’s time-varying toll, as
Table 1. Parameters used in the analytical solutions for step-coarse toll models.
Scenarios s v m l
MD
1+h2ð Þh1
1+ 2h1+h2
h2  1ð Þs
1+h2ð Þ h1+h2ð Þ
h2  1ð Þs
1+h2ð Þ h1+h2ð Þ
1+h2
2
SW d 0 0 h2
BI
1+h2ð Þh2h1
h1+h2 1+h2ð Þ
 h2s
1+h2ð Þ h1+h2ð Þ
h1s
1+h2ð Þ h1+h2ð Þ
h2 1+h2ð Þ
1+ 2h2
MD: mass departure; SW: separated waiting; BI: braking-induced idling.
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shown in Xiao et al.29 (for homogeneous commuters)
and Tian et al.27 (with heterogeneous commuters).
While social optimum (SO) TCS is capable of
eliminating queuing delays completely, it requires a
continuously adjusting credit charges which can be dif-
ficult to implement in practice. Recognizing the impor-
tance of simplicity, Nie22 proposed a TCS that aims at
replicating the effect of a step-coarse toll with homoge-
neous commuters. Therefore, it is straightforward to
start the analysis with user heterogeneity in the context
of TCS and in particular its welfare and distributional
effects.
The toll scheme formulated in section ‘‘TCS for a sin-
gle bottleneck with heterogeneity’’ keeps the toll rate
constant in a time window to reallocate the peak demand
on the congested highway. Such a pricing structure is not
very well accepted by travelers as it may lead to issues of
fairness and the lack of alternative mode of travel.
Redistributing the toll revenue to the auto travelers can
deal with some of these issues, so can provide attractive
policies and services for rewarding travel by public trans-
port. Here, we consider a policy based on the TCS for
reducing congestion costs in a two-mode network. We
examine the two subsystems of TCS: a credit charging
and a credit distribution schemes.
Analysis of mode choice with TCS
Unlike the auto mode, we assume that (1) the capacity
of transit mode is sufficiently large, (2) the transit pat-
tern ignore that schedule late or early cost, and (3) the
cost of commuting by transit depends only on the in-
vehicle travel time cost. Since we assume the free-flow
travel time for highway is zero, then T can be regard as
additional constant travel time in relation to the auto
mode. Commuters can travel on the highway either by
car, experiencing queuing and schedule delays, or by
transit, experiencing a longer travel time but no delays.
Note that a necessary condition for both modes to be
used is
T =
uNd
s
, u 2 0, 1ð Þ ð17Þ
Under no-toll scheme, Nf = uN , that is, travel cost for
the Nf th commuter is indifferent between choosing either
auto or transit mode. Under TCS, because only the ratio
between the rewarded and charged credits matters, the
number of charged credits k is set to 1. Furthermore, the
transit users will be rewarded rb credits. Let Nf be the
total number of users who use the highway route, and Nu
be the portion of Nf that do not use the bottleneck within
the charging window. We define
p=
Nu
Nf
ð18Þ
and naturally, p 2 ½0, 1, with the new notation, and
noting from equation (8) that
r=s
Nu
s
a Nuð Þ ð19Þ
The total system cost can be rewritten as follows
STC=A1h1 t
  teð Þ+A2h1 t  t+
 
+BT ð20Þ
and
A1=
ðNu
0
a xð Þdx, A2=
ðNf
Nu
a xð Þdx, B=
ðN
Nf
a xð Þdx ð21Þ
Substituting equations (7) and (8) into equation (20),
and using equation (18), the optimal flow distribution
(Nf ) and p can be solved from the following optimiza-
tion problem
min STC=A d vh1pð Þ
Nf
s
 A2spNf
s
+B
duN
s
Subject to : 0 p 1; 0Nf N
ð22Þ
where v ands are defined in Table 1. Equation (22)
implicitly determines the optimal Nf and p, as long as
the VOT distribution of the commuter population is
known. Then, P, r, and rb can be obtained by solving
the following equation system
a Nf
 
T  Prb=a Nf
  1 pð ÞdNf
s
+P ð23Þ
N  Nf
 
rb+Nur=Nf  Nu ð24Þ
P=
r
1+ r
ð25Þ
In equation (23), Nf represents the watershed divid-
ing users between the two modes. Note that the travel
cost for the users Nf is indifferent between choosing
either auto or transit mode. Equation (24) states the
credit conservation condition, while equation (25) as
derived from equation (16) states the relationship
between the credit price and the coarse toll.
The number of peak-time highway users
Nt=(1 p)Nf , and accordingly the cost of peak and
non-peak-time highway users are
ct xð Þ=a xð Þ dNt
s
+P, cu xð Þ=a xð Þ d vh1pð Þ
Nf
s
 Pr
ð26Þ
Note that if Nf =N , that is, the transit is not used, then
rb should equal to zero, and r and P are obtained by sol-
ving equations (24) and (25).
The above analysis also provides a framework to
evaluate the efficiency of a given TCS defined by r and
6 Advances in Mechanical Engineering
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rb. Specifically, one can solve Nf , p, and P from equa-
tions (23) to (25) and hence obtain the system travel
cost, once r and rb are given.
Changes in individual travel cost
Once the TCS is implemented, the whole traveling pop-
ulation can then be divided into four groups, as follows:
1. The group with high VOT who remains on transit
service. Their travel costs will never increase because
the transit mode is free of congestion, and these com-
muters benefit most from selling their earned credits
to other commuters. The cost change is
Dc xð Þ=  Prb\0 ð27Þ
2. The group of commuters who are forced to shift
from auto to transit. Those commuters have relatively
low VOTs, and by shifting modes, they experience a
longer travel time, although the credit charge is
avoided. In addition, they receive a subsidy to cover
the additional travel time cost. The cost change is
Dc xð Þ=a xð ÞTt  Prb  a xð Þ
Nf
s
d=  Prb\0 ð28Þ
3. The group of commuters who remain on highway
during peak-time window. These travelers pay the
credits and enjoy a travel time reduction because the
highway is less congested with less demand. The
travel costs can be higher or lower depending on
whether the reduction of delay cost covers the credit
charge. Comparing the two costs before and after
the scheme, the cost change is
Dc xð Þ=a xð Þ 1 pð ÞdN^ f
s
+P a xð Þ d
Nf
s
ð29Þ
where Nf and N^f are give by equations (17) and (22).
Taking the first-order derivative, we have Dc9 xð Þ\0,
which implies that the commuters with higher VOT will
experience more travel cost decrease.
4. The group of commuters who remain on highway
during non-peak-time window. As will be seen later,
in some cases, this group of commuters can benefit
from the scheme, whereas in other cases, some of
them will not
Dc xð Þ=a xð Þ d
s
N^ f  Nf
  Pr ð30Þ
The changes in the travel costs of commuters after
implementing the TCS are summarized by the follow-
ing piecewise function
Dc xð Þ=
a xð Þ d
s
N^ f  Nf
  Pr, 0\x\Nu
a xð Þ d
s
1 pð ÞN^ f  Nf
 
+P, Nu\x\N^ f
Prb, N^ f\x\N
8><
>:
ð31Þ
where Nf is derived from equation (17), N^f and Nu are
give by equations (22) and (18). The first equation of
equation (31) is for the non-peak-time highway com-
muters, the second for the peak-time highway commu-
ters, and the last for the transit users.
In the following section, we only consider the SW
assumption and a uniform VOT distribution for better
analytical tractability. Finding the analytical solutions
for the other assumptions is tedious but relatively
straightforward following the procedure used in SW.
Hence, we shall examine the impact of different beha-
vior assumptions in numerical experiment.
Special case: heterogeneous commuters
Finding an analytical solution to the above problem is
tedious, and we shall examine the impacts of different
behavior assumptions and congestion effects in numeri-
cal experiment. Below, we show how such an analysis
can be conducted when VOT follows a uniform distri-
bution, a(x)= ax, and the SW assumption is employed.
Substituting a(x)= ax into equation (22) and using
the first-order derivation equals to zero, that is,
∂STC=∂Nf = 0, we have
Nf =
2Ts
3d 1 p+ p3ð Þ ð32Þ
Using equation (17), then the above equation can be
rewritten as follows
Nf =
2u
3 1 p+ p3ð ÞN ð33Þ
Now, from equation (8), we can obtain the equili-
brium credit price as follows
P=
r
1+ r
=
2Nudp
3s 1 p+ p3ð Þ 1+ rð Þa Nuð Þ ð34Þ
The credits reward to the transit riders should be set
such that the income from selling them would be able
to offset the cost difference between the two modes,
that is
a Nf
 
T  Prb=a Nf
  1 pð ÞNf d
s
+P ð35Þ
Finally, the credit conservation condition dictates
that
N  Nf
 
rb+Nur=Nf  Nu ð36Þ
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Combining equations (33), (35), and (36), we can
find
r=
p2u
u+ p 1ð Þ u  uð Þ+ up3  1,
rb=
u+ p 1ð Þu
u+ p 1ð Þ u  uð Þ+ up3  1
ð37Þ
where
u=
3 1 p+ p3ð Þ
2
ð38Þ
Proposition 1. Under the system optimal tradable credit
scheme (SO-TCS), (1) if u  u, only the highway
should be used, and p= 1
 ﬃﬃﬃ
3
p
for auto users; (2) if
0\u\u, both transit and the highway should be used
and p= 1
 ﬃﬃﬃ
3
p
for auto users; and (3) if u= 0, only
transit should be used.
Proof. Condition 3 is trivial: if T = 0, the total system
cost will be zero and everyone will use transit. To prove
condition 1, first note that when both the primary route
and transit are used, the minimum system cost can be
written as
STC=
a
2
ud
s
N3 1 4u
2
27 1 p+ p3ð Þ2
 !
If only the highway is used, then the minimum sys-
tem cost is obtained when p= 1
 ﬃﬃﬃ
3
p
as
STC=
a
2
dN 3
s
1 p+ p3 
We prove condition 1 by contradiction now.
Suppose when u  u, both the highway and transit
have to be used in order to minimize the total cost.
This implies STC\STC, which in turn implies
1+ p p3 \ 2u
3
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
u
3 u 1ð Þ+ 2 ﬃﬃﬃ3p
s
Combining this inequality with equation (33) yields
Nf =
2u
3 1 p+ p3ð ÞN.
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
3 2
u
u
r
N  N
The last inequality holds because u  u. This is a
contradiction. Hence, when u  u, traveler would only
use the highway, and the system cost is minimized when
p= 1
 ﬃﬃﬃ
3
p
.
The proof of Proposition 1 shows clearly that both
the highway and the transit service should be used when
u\u. It is easy to verify that to minimize STC with
respect to p, p must equal to 1=
ﬃﬃﬃ
3
p
. This completes the
proof.
Proposition 1 assures that at the system optimum,
p= 1=
ﬃﬃﬃ
3
p
. With p being determined, the key design
variables for the TCS can now be obtained as follows
r=
u 1=2
3=2 u , rb=
u
3=2 u ,
P=
adN2
3s
u
u
 2
3
2
 u
  ð39Þ
when u 2 (0, (3=2) (1= ﬃﬃﬃ3p )), we have
 1
3
 r
ﬃﬃﬃ
3
p
 1, 0\rb\ 3
2
ﬃﬃﬃ
3
p
 1, 0\P\ adN
2
3
ﬃﬃﬃ
3
p
s
ð40Þ
Note that the nonpeak users on highway may receive
negative credits, that is, r becomes negative when the
travel time of using transit is smaller than half of the
no-toll generalized travel time on the highway (u\0:5).
This is intuitive since when transit service becomes so
attractive such that its travel time is less than half of the
Nd=s, travelers should not be given credits for staying
on the highway, even during the nonpeak time.
Hereafter, we examine the welfare effects of the sys-
tem travel cost with TCS and compare it to the system
trip cost under no-toll equilibrium. Equation (17) indi-
cates that the number of highway users Nf = uN .
Therefore, the system trip cost under no-toll scheme
can be formulated as STCN = adN
3u=2s, if u 1. When
u.1, all commuters will stay on the transit line, and
the system trip cost is STCN = adN
3=2s.
For SO-TCS, the analysis in Proposition 1 shows
that when u\u, both the highway route and the transit
line will be used, with the number of highway uses given
as equation (33). When u.u, all users will stay on the
transit line. Thereafter, the system trip cost under TCS
can be formulated as follows
STC=
a
2
dN 3
s
u 4u3
27 1p+ p3ð Þ2 , if u u

1 p+ p3, if u\u
(
ð41Þ
where u=(3=2)(1 p+ p3) and p= 1 ﬃﬃﬃ3p . Note that
the efficiency gains of the SO-TCS with heterogeneous
travelers is
e uð Þ= STCN  STC

STCN
= 1max 1 4u
2
27 1 p+ p3ð Þ ,
1 p+ p3
u
 	
ð42Þ
It is clear that the efficiency gains first increases from
0% to 20.5% as u is increased from 0 to u and then
reached the top value 38.5% when u reached 1.
8 Advances in Mechanical Engineering
 at University of Leeds on January 20, 2016ade.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Numerical examples
In this section, we provide numerical examples to illus-
trate the differences under the TCS discussed in the
previous sections between homogeneous and heteroge-
neous traveling populations. We assume the demand
N = 100, and the capacity of the bottleneck s= 50
(veh/h). The value attached to queuing delay a follows
a uniform distribution a(x)= ax+ b and is distributed
in the interval ½a e, a+ e, while a is the mean value
and e defined as the standard error. Thus, a= 2e=N
and b= a e. Following Arnott et al.,2 we set the
mean values a= 6:4 $=h, b= 3:9 $=h, and
g= 15:21 $=h, and from which, we let h1= 0:609 and
h2= 2:377.
Figure 2 shows how the SO credit costs under SW
assumption changes with parameter u for the three
groups. The peak-time highway users incur the largest
cost to acquire credits, whereas the transit users benefit
most from selling their credits to other commuters.
However, the credit cost of peak-time highway users
invariably peaks and that of transit users reaches zero
when u is around 0.92 (i.e. all users will be on the
highway).
We further investigate the difference in equilibrium
trip cost between the TCS and the no-toll scheme with
SW assumption, as denoted by Dc. Figure 3 shows the
variation of Dc with different values of u. It can be seen
that all three curves are composed of three piecewise
linear functions (i.e. three commuter groups), and the
value of Dc can be either positive or negative when
u= 0:5, implying that the TCS can either increase or
decrease the commuter trip cost. One can observe from
this figure that the slop of the peak-time highway users
is decreasing with VOT. This means that the commu-
ters with higher VOT are better off more quickly than
lower value commuters, while the curve of the transit
users is negative and benefit most from selling their
earned credits to other commuters.
Figure 4 shows the percentage reduction in system
travel cost (excluding credit) generated by TCS based
on homogeneous commuters and a special case of het-
erogeneity, as a function of u. It can be seen that the
TCS can achieve up to 33.3% efficiency gains in the
homogeneous case, while for the heterogeneous com-
muters, the efficiency gains increase with increasing u
value and reach the top 38.5% at u= 1. For small u
value, the efficiency gains have been overestimated with
homogeneity, while a higher u would actually increase
the efficiency gains in the context of heterogeneity.
Figure 5 shows how the design variable of SO-TCS
as well as the corresponding equilibrium flow pattern
changed with T and e. Note that e implies the distribu-
tion effect. We vary the e value between 0 and 6.4,
while e equals to zero represents the homogeneous case.
Figure 5(a) shows that the system travel cost (i.e. STC)
changes monotonically with T value. For homogeneous
case (i.e. e= 0), when T is around 1.46 (i.e. u= 1:5),
Figure 2. SO-TCS solutions with SW assumption. Figure 3. Change in travel cost with TCS.
Figure 4. Percentage reduction in system travel cost due to
TCS as a function of u.
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the system travel cost invariably peaks. This is because
no traveler would use the transit line even under SO-
TCS. In addition, for e= 6:4, only the highway line
should be used when T is not less than 0.90.
Figure 5(b) shows the credit price (i.e. P) is a concave
function of T for homogeneous case. For small T value,
however, a higher e would actually lower credit price.
Moreover, under heterogeneous case, the credit price is
underestimated with homogeneity for high T value.
Figure 5(c) shows that the percentage of the non-
peak-time users (i.e. p) is increasing with e value. This
is as expected since increasing the e value is equivalent
to increasing the difference in VOT among commuters
and pushing more commuters to having higher or
lower VOTs; therefore, more commuters will choose to
depart from home outside the peak time to avoid the
increased overall trip cost (including credit charge).
Figure 5(d) suggests that e plays an important role in
determining flow distribution between the two alterna-
tives. However, a higher e always pushes more users to
the highway.
Figure 5(e) reveals that the off-peak-time users
ought to be rewarded more credits (i.e. r) when the
travel time T on transit is larger. In addition, a higher e
would actually increase the number of reward credits.
Interestingly, the same trend is observed for the transit
users, as shown in Figure 5(f).
Figure 6 repeats the above sensitivity analysis for
when the demand N is increased gradually from 100 to
500. Figure 6(a) shows that the system travel cost (i.e.
STC) increase with N . As expected, larger e values cor-
respond to larger system travel cost, and the relative
influence of e is stronger for larger T . Figure 6(b) shows
that the credit price (i.e. P) increases with N when
e= 0, while for e= 6:4, the result turns reverse. Figure
6(d) shows that larger N consistently reduces the per-
centage of highway users, although the trend is slowed
down by larger e on commuters distribution. Similar to
Figure 5(e) and (f), Figure 6(e) and (f) suggests that
more credits should be rewarded in respond to larger e.
Figure 7 shows the sensitivity analysis results when
capacity s is changed from 20 (u= 0:2) to 100 (u= 2).
Note the patterns described in Figure 7(c)–(f) are remark-
ably similar to the corresponding plots in Figure 5.
Figure 7(a) shows that the system travel cost (i.e. STC)
decrease monotonically as s increases, and larger e values
correspond to larger system travel cost for small s.
However, when s is increasing, a higher e would actually
lower the system travel cost. Figure 7(b) shows that var-
iance e seems to lower the credit price for small s.
Figure 8 compares the results for the three behavior
assumptions when e= 6:4 (heterogeneous case). Figure
8(a) shows that the MD and BI assumptions lead to
slightly lower and higher system travel costs, respec-
tively. Figure 8(b) shows that the MD assumption gives
higher credit price, while the BI assumption gives lower
credit price. Figure 8(c) shows that the percentage of
non-peak-time highway user (i.e. Nu/Nf) is slightly
affected by the behavior assumption. The percentage is
about 60.1% for the MD assumption, 57.7% for SW,
and about 53.4% for BI. The percentages, however, are
not affected by T. Figure 8(e) and (f) shows that the
differences in the credit given by these assumptions are
not noticeably larger, especially for small T .
Figure 5. SO-TSC solutions changed with T under SW
assumption.
Figure 6. SO-TCS solutions changed with N under SW
assumption.
10 Advances in Mechanical Engineering
 at University of Leeds on January 20, 2016ade.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Summary and concluding remarks
In this article, the economics of a morning commute
problem on a single bottleneck is investigated for a het-
erogeneous commuter population and with a choice of
auto and transit mode of travel. First, we derived
the equilibrium departure-time profiles for the
heterogeneous commuters, under no-toll condition.
The corresponding individual trip cost and the total
system trip cost are presented. For heterogeneous com-
muters, queuing delay is a pure loss, and it remains that
congestion toll is effective for reducing the queues
behind the bottleneck. We proposed a TCS as an alter-
native demand management strategy to replace the
step-coarse toll. TCS works like a single-coarse toll,
except that the price of the credit is determined by the
competitive market. It is a combination of two sub-
schemes: a credit charging and a credit distribution
schemes. We analyzed TCS under three different beha-
vior assumptions, namely, MD, SW, and BI. With each
behavior assumption, we presented the optimum ratio
of the unit of reward and charge credits. For TCS with
a coarse toll alternative, the departure pattern of com-
muters with heterogeneous commuters is similar to the
homogeneous case. Still, a difference that arises for the
ratio of the unit of reward and charge credits, which is
due to the pattern of distribution effect, is different
with respect to VOT.
The main focus of this article is the two-mode prob-
lem under a tradable travel credit scheme, with a vari-
ety of assumptions about commuter’ behavior in
response to the discontinuous credit charge introduced
at the boundary of the peak-time window. In the simple
case (when VOT follows a linear function for the SW
assumption), the design of SO-TCS, including the
choice of the peak-time windows as well as the number
of credit rewarded to or charged on different groups of
commuters, can be described using simple formulas.
These analytical results indicate that the equilibrium
solutions are only affected by the relative generalized
travel time of the two routes (u). To better deal with
welfare estimation under user heterogeneity, different u
value is introduced for auto and transit modes to cap-
ture the realistic aspect associated with the two-mode
equilibrium. We show that SO-TCS can either increase
or decrease the commuter trip cost: the peak-time high-
way commuters with higher VOT are better off more
quickly than lower VOT users, while the commuters at
the highest end of the VOT distribution who take tran-
sit are made better off by SO-TCS.
With a general VOT distribution of heterogeneous
users, the characteristics of the SO-TCS under the
above three different behavioral assumptions are com-
pared with those with homogeneous commuters. It
showed that the characteristics of traffic patterns for
homogeneous and heterogeneous commuters are mark-
edly different. Without considering commuter heteroge-
neity, the number of peak-time highway commuters,
the credit reward-to-charge ratio and the transit users
are all overestimated. The e value on the VOT distribu-
tion increases the difference in VOT among commuters
and pushing more commuters to having higher or lower
VOTs; therefore, more commuters will choose to depart
Figure 8. SO-TCS solutions under different behavior
assumptions (e= 6:4).
Figure 7. SO-TCS solutions changed with s under SW
assumption.
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from home outside the peak-time interval, and more
commuters will switch into highway from transit line to
avoid the increased overall trip cost (including credit
charge). In addition, the e value can lead to higher sys-
tem cost and higher credit price and can cause more
credits to be rewarded to both the off-peak-time on
highway and transit users. Different assumptions about
commuters’ behavior do affect most SO-TCS design
variables, and the influences tend to be slightly magni-
fied by the e value on VOT.
Overall, our findings suggest that it is important to
take into account the heterogeneity of commuters in
assessing the impacts of tradable credit under two-
mode system. The analyses presented in this article
still leave out a few important real-world features, of
which the most critical is perhaps corridor network
with multiple bottlenecks. In our future work, we
plan to further extend the application of the credit
scheme to solve a multi-route and multi-mode prob-
lem and to manage traffic demands, parking spots,
and emissions.
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